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Abstract:  In this Article, Professor Starnes surveys a collection of alimony 
theories, grouping them into three categories:  gain theory, loss theory, and 
contribution theory.  She concludes that gain theory offers the most satisfactory 
theoretical basis for alimony, not only for the clarity of its quantification model, 
but also for the status it assigns alimony claimants, who are cast as equal partners 
in marriage rather than as victims of marriage.  
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Family law offers no answer to the question of why anyone should be forced 
to share income with a former spouse.  For over thirty years, commentators have 
struggled to explain why alimony has survived the demise of coverture and the 
advent of no-fault divorce, but there is still no consensus on a contemporary 
rationale for alimony.  The broad discretion vested in judges to determine alimony 
eligibility and quantification, together with the absence of a theory to guide 
decision-making, has produced an alimony regime marked by unpredictability, 
uncertainty, and confusion.  The one thing that is predictable about alimony is that 
it is not likely to be awarded, a fact that is not surprising in a society that applauds 
independence and self-reliance.   
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 John F. Schaefer Chair of Matrimonial Law and Professor of Law, Michigan State University 
College of Law.  This article is a condensed version of an earlier publication:  Cynthia Lee 
Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L. Q. 271 (2011). 
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Some legal actors have responded to the dysfunction of current alimony law 
by endorsing alimony guidelines, but the absence of an underlying theory of 
alimony confounds efforts to identify a mathematical formula for generating the 
numbers that populate these guidelines.  As a consequence, guidelines may make 
alimony more predictable within an adopting jurisdiction, but they do not 
necessarily make alimony more equitable or more consistent among jurisdictions. 
So why not just get rid of alimony?  The problem with this “solution” is that 
alimony is often the only available tool for addressing cases in which marital roles 
have left divorcing spouses with disparate earning capacity at divorce.  In these 
economic times, divorcing couples increasingly have few if any significant assets, 
which renders property distribution a useless tool and makes income sharing, i.e., 
alimony, the only available economic remedy for the primary caretaker.  
It is easy enough to identify distinctions among the many theories of 
alimony.  But it is also possible and important to identify common ground, which 
can provide a basis for more consistent, predictable and equitable alimony 
guidelines.  This Article seeks to further that goal by surveying and critiquing an 
illustrative assortment of alimony theories.  This task begins with a closer look at 
the problem theorists believe alimony should address.   
 
I.  The Problem 
Alimony theorists are remarkably consistent in their description of the 
problem alimony aims to address.  In 2002, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
summarized this problem in its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
(“Principles”).  The ALI noted that “wives continue in the great majority of cases 
to care for their children, in reliance upon continued market labor by their 
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husbands,”2 and that these caretaking responsibilities “typically result . . . in a 
residual loss in earning capacity that continues after the children no longer require 
close parental supervision.”3 In such cases, the caretaker has fulfilled the couple’s 
“joint responsibility for their children’s care,” allowing the other parent “to have a 
family while also developing his or her earning capacity.”  In the absence of any 
remedy, at divorce “the primary wage earner retains both that earning capacity and 
the parental status, while in the absence of any remedy the primary caretaker loses 
any claim upon the other spouse’s earnings.”4   
The peril faced by divorcing primary caretakers is exacerbated by 
circumstances that provide distorting incentives for men to divorce their wives.  As 
Lloyd Cohen explained, while marriage promises gains to both parties at the time 
they marry, these gains are not “symmetrical,” i.e., they are realized at different 
times in the relationship.
5
  “As a rule, men tend to obtain gains early in the 
relationship, when their own contributions to the marriage are relatively low and 
that of their wives relatively great.  Similarly, later on in marriage women tend as a 
general rule to obtain more from the contract than do men.”  This imbalance 
                                                 
 
2
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS   (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] § 5.05 reporter’s notes cmt. c. 
 
3
 Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.  “Whether or not women actually leave full-time employment after the birth 
of their children,” the ALI observed, “studies consistently show that they usually perform far 
more than half of the married couples domestic chores.  For this reason, the birth of children 
usually affects the earning capacity of women who continue to work full time as well as those 
who do not.”  Id. § 5.05 reporter’s notes cmt. d. 
 
4
 Id. § 5.05 cmt. e.  The ALI further reasons that “[t]o leave the financially dependent spouse in a 
long marriage without a remedy would facilitate the exploitation of the trusting spouse and 
discourage domestic investments by the nervous one.”  Id. § 5.04 cmt. c. 
 
5
 Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of my 
Life,” 16 J. LEG. STUD. 267, 278-303 (1987).   
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“provides the opportunity for strategic behavior whereby one of the parties, 
generally the man, might find it in his interest to breach the contract unless 
otherwise constrained.”6  
It is difficult to dispute the point, or perhaps the intuition, that if marital 
roles diminish a primary caretaker’s earning capacity, divorce law should not allow 
her husband to shed her at will, setting her “free” to alone bear the costs of family 
labor.  As a California court observed long ago: 
A woman is not a breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of 
fecundity, then conveniently and economically converted to cheap 
steaks when past her prime .  . . This has nothing to do with feminism, 
sexism, male chauvinism, or any other trendy social ideology.  It is 
ordinary common sense, basic decency and simple justice.
7
 
 
II.  Theories of Alimony 
Once upon a time the rationale for alimony was easy enough:  at marriage a 
husband undertook a lifetime obligation to support his wife; alimony was the 
judicial tool for enforcing this husbandly duty during any periods of spousal 
separation.  Contemporary visions of marriage and divorce are very different.  
Today, divorce is normatively cast as the end of spousal ties, an opportunity for a 
fresh start and a clean break, no matter who or what caused the marital breakdown.  
And marriage is no longer viewed as the union of a dominant male and a 
dependent female, but rather as a partnership of equals.  Can such egalitarian 
visions yield a theory of alimony?  
Most modern reform theories focus primarily on one of three interests:  a 
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 Id. at 287.  See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1312-13 (1998) (noting “the failure of contemporary legal rules governing 
divorce to protect marital investment adequately and to discourage opportunistic defection”).       
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claimant’s expected gain; a claimant’s loss; or a claimant’s contributions to the 
other spouse.  These foci are familiar to any student of contracts, for they suggest 
the three classic contract interests of expectation,
 
 reliance, and restitution.
 8
  This 
section thus classifies reform theories into three categories: 
(1) Gain Theory (emphasizing expected returns on marital investments)  
(2) Loss Theory (emphasizing compensation for loss experienced at divorce) 
(3) Contribution Theory (emphasizing reimbursement for marital 
contributions)  
 
A.  Gain Theory 
An understanding of gain theory begins a look at early human capital
9
 
theorists who argued that a spouse who finances her mate’s education is entitled to 
compensation if the marriage ends.  In these cases, the marital unit makes an 
investment in the student’s human capital, both parties expecting that this joint 
investment will generate a return – the student’s enhanced earnings -- that the 
marital unit will enjoy.  If the parties divorce, the non-student is thus entitled to a 
share of her expected gain, i.e., to a return on her marital investment.   
Most alimony claimants, however, have not supported their spouse through 
school.  If gain theory is to offer a satisfactory rationale for alimony, it must also 
address more ordinary cases.  Some contemporary theorists have built on human 
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 The expectation interest protects a party’s “interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being 
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1979).  The reliance interest protects a party 
who has “changed position in reliance on the contract by incurring expenses in preparation or in 
performance.”  Id. § 344( b) (1979).  The restitution interest protects a party’s “interest in having 
restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.”  Id. § 344( c) (1979). 
9
 See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse’s Education:  Legal 
Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 381 (1980); and 
Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus:  In Search of Equity in “Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse” 
Divorce, 63 NYU L. REV. 751 (1988). 
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capital theory to offer more expansive versions of gain theory.  Jana Singer 
provides a good example.  Although she does not label her income-sharing 
proposal “alimony,” her model is pure gain theory.  Singer reasons that each 
spouse makes “an equal (although not necessarily identical) investment in a 
marriage.”  At divorce, each spouse is thus entitled to “an equal share of the fruits 
of the marriage.”  Singer stresses that “the emphasis of such an investment 
partnership model is not on formal equal treatment of the spouses at the time of 
divorce, but on each spouse receiving equal benefits from the marriage.” 10 
I have proposed a gain-based rationale for alimony built on a loose analogy 
to partnership buyouts:   
Like commercial partners, spouses commonly pool their labor, time, 
and talent to meet responsibilities and to generate income that they 
expect to share. . . . Often, the spouses’ combined efforts generate 
enhanced human capital primarily for the husband who has invested 
more extensively in paid employment than his primary caretaker 
spouse.  In such a case it is the marital partnership, rather than the 
husband alone, that has produced the husband’s enhanced human 
capital.  Although divorce terminates the parties’ relationship, it 
usually does not terminate the husband’s income stream, which 
continues to reflect the enhanced value produced through joint marital 
efforts.  Such a husband should therefore buy out the interest of his 
wife at divorce.
11
 
 
Another version of gain theory comes from Stephen Sugarman, who 
suggests a merger of spouses’ human capital over time.  Sugarman reasons that the 
longer parties are married, “the more their human capital should be seen as 
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 Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (1989). 
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 Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers:  Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 
90 IA. L. REV. 1513, 1543-44 (2005).  See also Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the 
Displaced Homemaker;  A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and 
Dissociation under No-Fault, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 70 (1993) [hereinafter Starnes, 
Displaced Homemakers]. 
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intertwined rather than affixed to the individual spouse in whose body it resides.”12  
Under this reasoning, each spouse’s interest in the other’s human capital entitles 
each to a share of any enhanced earning capacity fostered by the marital division of 
labor.  
Robert Kirkman Collins’s theory of “marital residuals” also evidences gain 
theory.  Collins calls for “an equitable sharing of the residual economic benefits 
from work done during the marriage.”13 By way of example, he offers the vision of 
a couple pedaling a tandem bicycle: 
[The bicycle] will not come to a screeching halt the moment that one 
or both riders stops pedaling; while current efforts may cease, the 
momentum from their prior work continues to carry the pair forward 
at a gradually decreasing pace until the effects of friction (of the sort 
known to physicists, as opposed to that found in disintegrating 
marriages) eventually cause the bicycle to stop.  How long the two 
riders will continue to coast forward will be a direct function of how 
fast they were going – that is, how great their momentum had been 
when the joint efforts stopped.
14
 
 
Collins thus characterizes alimony as “a decreasing share of marital residuals.”  
Gain theorists’ vision of marriage focuses on collaboration, and teamwork, 
as partnerships between spouses who join together to produce mutual benefits 
which they expect to share – income and a home with children.  If their marriage 
ends, divorce law must impose an exit price on the spouse who takes the larger 
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 Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE 
CROSSROADS 130, 159-60 (1990).       
 
13
 Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals:  Applying an Income Adjustment 
Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 23, 49 (2001).  
 
14
 Collins himself identifies his theory as gains based:  “Rather than an attempt to share the loss 
stemming from marital dissolution, this approach seeks to establish a fair allocation of the 
residual gains accruing after the fact from the marital venture.”  Id. at 49.  
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share of marital returns with him.  This price will usually take the form of income 
sharing, and is gain theorists’ rationale for alimony.   
A key feature of gain theory is its general disinterest in relative spousal 
contributions.  Gain theorists assume that spouses are equals -- an assigned status 
that does not depend on the type or size of each spouses’ contribution.  As equals, 
spouses are entitled to equal returns on communal, joint investments, no matter 
who brought home the bigger paycheck, no matter who was the better cook.   
Gain theory does not depend on an expectation that marriage will last 
forever.  No marriage lasts forever; all marriages end in either death or divorce.  
The expectation at the heart of gain theory is that each spouse will realize a return 
on marital investment before the marriage ends.  As Lloyd Cohen as so vividly 
described, marital gains are often not symmetrical for spouses; wage-earners tend 
to obtain gains early on in the marriage, while homemakers tend to reap gains later 
in the relationship.  If the timing of divorce leaves spouses asymmetrically 
positioned, the marriage ends prematurely from the perspective of the spouse who 
has not yet realized expected gain.
15
  This disparately impacted spouse, often a 
primary caretaker, is thus entitled to compensation.   
 
B.  Loss Theory  
Loss theorists focus on the reliance costs of participating in a “failed” 
marriage.  Their aim is to put the injured spouse “in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the contract not been made.”16  In his 1989 article, The Theory of 
Alimony, Ira Mark Ellman argues that “[t]he main residual financial consequence 
of a failed marriage is a reduction in one spouse’s earning capacity (usually the 
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 Cohen, supra note 5, at 287. 
 
16
 See RESTATEMENT  OF  CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 344(b). 
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wife’s) compared to the earning capacity she would have had if she had not 
married.”  “Alimony,” Ellman reasons, “should compensate a spouse for the 
“residual” loss in earning capacity arising from “economically rational marital 
sharing behavior,” since without such protection a “rational spouse will pause 
before making a marital investment.”  The purpose of alimony, concludes Ellman 
is thus “to reallocate the postdivorce financial consequences of marriage in order to 
prevent distorting incentives.”17 
The ALI offers a similar view, conceptualizing alimony as compensation for 
loss and recognizing two primary types of compensable loss:  (1) loss of the 
marital standard of living in a marriage of “sufficient duration”18 and (2) a residual 
loss in earning capacity that results from primary caretaking.
19
  While the ALI goes 
to some trouble to identify the parameters of compensable loss, it has been 
criticized for its failure to explain convincingly why these losses are compensable.   
Other loss theorists include Twila Perry, who analogizes to strict liability in 
tort, arguing that alimony should compensate a spouse for disproportionate 
economic loss caused by the “accident” of divorce.20  
Loss theory and gain theory sometimes recognize flip sides of the same coin, 
as for example where a primary homemaker has lost career opportunities, which 
leave her with a smaller share of returns on marital investments, i.e., lower earning 
                                                 
17
 Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 50, 51  (1989). 
 
18
 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2 § 5.04 (1).   
 
19
 Id. § 5.05 (1).     
 
20
 Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault:  Can Family Law Learn from 
Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 55, 66-67 (1991).  Perry suggests that economic losses resulting from 
divorce might be spread over a large number of people through public or private insurance 
programs that compensate spouses injured by divorce, though she expresses doubt that private 
companies would find this venture profitable or that public social insurance for divorce would be 
a viable alternative.  Id. at 81. 
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capacity than her spouse.  Loss theory and gain theory differ significantly, 
however, in the roles they assign alimony claimants.  If the need-based approach of 
current alimony law casts alimony claimants as beggars, a loss-based model casts 
them as victims.  Gain theory, on the other hand, casts a claimant as an equal 
stakeholder in marriage.  Moreover, as we shall see, loss theory poses difficult 
quantification problems that often lead loss theorists to resort to the more 
straightforward measurement models of gain theory.  One might thus reasonably 
question whether loss theory offers any advantages over gain theory.   
 
C.  Contribution Theory  
Contribution theory protects a promisee’s “interest in having restored 
to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.”21  Such an 
interest is compensated to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.  
If benefits are conferred gratuitously, there is no unjust enrichment and 
hence no compensation due.  By way of analogy, an alimony theory based 
on restitution measures the contributions a claimant made to her spouse and 
then asks whether that sum must be reimbursed in order to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  
  In its narrowest form, contribution theory provides a rationale for requiring 
a student spouse to reimburse his/her mate for sums contributed to the student’s 
education or training – for example, tuition, books, lab fees, and perhaps living 
expenses.  Contribution theory, however, supports only a limited recovery – 
reimbursement of contributions.  Moreover, contribution theory limits alimony to 
extraordinary cases.   
Contribution theory might broaden its reach by expanding the concept of 
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 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344( c) (1979). 
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contribution to include family labor, but this approach is problematic for several 
reasons.  First, “ordinary” marital benefits are usually conferred with donative 
intent and so may not unjustly enrich the other spouse.  Determining whether a 
spouse’s contributions are ordinary or extra-ordinary, and so compensable, invites 
value judgments that depend on the judge’s personal view of marital roles.  
Additionally, contribution theory implicitly rejects a view of spouses as equal 
contributors to marriage, instead requiring  spouses to identify, value, and compare 
their individual contributions in a process that is difficult to reconcile with 
contemporary visions of marriage as a partnership of equals.  
 
III.  The Mathematics of Alimony 
Alimony theorists have offered an array of formulae to quantify the value 
and duration of alimony.  These formulae vary widely, drawing on their underlying 
theory of alimony, and on the drafters’ intuition about how generous alimony 
awards should be.  A satisfactory quantification model will answer two questions 
about any alimony award:  (1) How much? (2) How long?   
The most straightforward and workable quantification models come from 
gain theorists.  Jana Singer, for example, suggests couples should equally share 
their combined income after divorce for a period based on the length of the 
marriage.  As a starting point for discussion, she suggests “one year of post-divorce 
income sharing for each two years of marriage.”22   
To implement my buyout model for alimony, I have suggested 
presumptively calculating the buyout price through a two-step formula:  (1) 
                                                 
22
 Singer, supra note 10, at 1117.  See also Jane Ellis, New Rules for Divorce:  Transition 
Payments, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 601 (1993-94) (suggesting transition payments for a 
period equal to one-half the length of the marriage).  Jane Rutherford proposes lifetime income 
sharing for homemakers based on their expectation to share income for life.  Jane Rutherford, 
Duty in Divorce:  Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990).  
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calculate the disparity in the spouses’ enhanced earnings; and (2) multiply that sum 
by a percentage based on the length of the marriage.  This percentage might be 
patterned after the Uniform Probate Code provision for a spouse’s elective share of 
an augmented estate, a percentage that gradually increases with the length of the 
marriage.
23
   
Drawing on his theory of marital residuals, Robert Kirkman Collins 
proposes a series of postmarital income adjustments, each with a presumptive 
calculation formula.  During the first period (immediately following separation) – 
the couple would share equally all disposable income; thereafter, they would share 
a decreasing percentage of the disparity in disposable income, declining by 10% in 
each period.  The “length of each period – and hence the angle of the decline in 
transfers -- is set as a function of the length of the marriage.”  At the end of the 
“economic phase-out period,” the parties would be “financially independent.” 24   
In his merger over time variant of gain theory, Stephen Sugarman suggests 
each spouse should take “a percentage interest in the other’s human capital/future 
earnings based upon the duration of the marriage.”  By way of example, he 
suggests 1.5% to 2% per year, after perhaps a minimum vesting period of 3 to 5 
years, and with a cap of 40%.
25
 
Loss theory does not offer such straightforward quantification mechanisms.  
How can lost opportunities be measured?  As Ellman explains, “[t]o identify these 
losses, we compare the claimant’s economic situation at the end of marriage with 
the situation she would have been in had she not married . . . The difference equals 
our general measure of the alimony claim against her husband.”  But how are we to 
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 Starnes, Displaced Homemakers, supra note 11, at 130-38 & n. 309. 
 
24
 Collins, supra note 13, at 51. 
 
25
 Sugarman, supra note 12, at 160. 
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know what she might have become but for her marriage?  As Ellman admits, 
answering this question is “in some sense impossible even in theory, as is any 
‘might have been.’”  “In the end,” says Ellman, “precision is not obtainable” and 
so alimony will depend on “the rough justice of trial court discretion.” 26  Not much 
of a “solution” to the current problems of alimony. 
The ALI finds a way to quantify its loss theory, which is very similar to  
Ellman’s – it borrows a formula from gain theory.  To presumptively value awards 
under its two primary sections, 5.04 and 5.05, the ALI proposes a two step process:  
(1) calculate the disparity in the spouses’s income at divorce, and (2) multiple that 
disparity by a percentage based on the length of the marriage (§ 5.04) or the length 
of the child care period (§ 5.05).
27
  To presumptively calculate the duration of a 
fixed-term award, the ALI suggests multiplying the length of the marriage (§ 5.04) 
or child care period (§ 5.05) by a percentage set out in a rule of statewide 
application.
28
  By way of example, the ALI suggests the duration of an award 
under section 5.04 might equal half the length of the marriage.
29
  The ALI 
quantification model makes sense, but it does not derive from loss theory, which 
requires measurement of an alimony claimant’s lost opportunity to remain single.  
                                                 
26
 Ellman, supra note 17, at 54, 78, 80. 
 
27
 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 5.04(3) (presumptive value of award “calculated by applying 
a specified percentage to the difference between the incomes the spouses are expected to have 
after dissolution.”);  (§ 5.05(4) (presumptive value of payments calculated “by applying a 
percentage, called the child-care durational factor, to the difference between the incomes the 
spouses are expected to have at dissolution.” (emphasis in original))    
 
28
 See id. § 5.04 (3).  By way of example, the ALI suggests a durational factor equal to the 
number of years of marriage multiplied by .01.  A marriage of 5 years would thus produce a 
presumptive alimony payment of 5% of any disparity in spousal earnings, 10% after 10 years, 
20% after 20 years, 40% after 40 years.  The ALI suggests payments should not exceed 40% of 
the earnings disparity, no matter how long the marriage or child care period.  See id. § 5.04 cmt. 
a.   
  
29
 Id. § 5.06 cmt b. 
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Rather, the formula is based on the gain theory principle that a marital investor is 
entitled to share returns (enhanced income) generated by marital investments.     
   A final quantification model, one not linked to a theory of alimony, comes 
from the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (“AAML”).  Based on a 
survey of alimony guidelines throughout the U.S., the AAML identified two 
common denominators:  income of the spouses and duration of the marriage.  
Drawing on these factors, the AAML in 2007 approved a simple formula that 
quantifies alimony in the absence of specified deviation factors.
30
  The value of an 
award is calculated “by taking 30% of the payor’s gross income minus 20% of the 
payee’s gross income,” capped at 40% of the combined gross income of the 
parties.”  The duration of an award is a function of the length of the marriage, and 
in the absence of deviation factors is calculated “by multiplying the length of the 
marriage by the following factors:  0-3 years (.3); 3-10 (.5); 10-20 years (.75), over 
20 years, permanent alimony.”  This model is attractive for its simplicity and for its 
similarity to quantification models based on gain theory.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For too long family law has operated without a satisfactory, consistent 
answer to the question of why alimony persists in an age of egalitarian visions of 
marriage and no-fault divorce.  Over the last thirty years, numerous commentators 
have offered rationales for alimony, but none has carried the day and the current 
law of alimony remains dysfunctional.  While the plethora of reform theories differ 
                                                 
30
 Mary Kay Kristhardt, Re-thinking Alimony:  The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating 
Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 61 (2008).  
Their review of alimony guidelines revealed two common denominators: income of the spouses 
and duration of the marriage. Id. at 78.  The Commission Recommendations list ten deviation 
factors, two of which were added after lengthy discussion upon presentation of the Commission 
Recommendations to the Board of Governors, which ultimately approved the recommendations 
at its March 2007 meeting. Id. at 79-80.   
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in many ways, at bottom, they tend to focus on one of three interests:  a claimant’s 
expected gain (gain theory); a claimant’s loss linked to divorce (loss theory) or a 
 claimant’s contributions to the other spouse (contribution theory).  While each of 
these theories has something to offer, only gain theory offers a helpful model for 
quantifying alimony.  Indeed, loss theory tends to borrow its quantification model 
from gain theory.  In the end, gain theory offers the most satisfactory theoretical 
basis for alimony, not only for the clarity of its quantification model, but also for 
the status it assigns alimony claimants, who are cast as equal partners in marriage 
rather than as victims of marriage.   
